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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT DEFENSE COUNSEL:
EMERGENCE OF A SIXTH AMENDMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL AND
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE "SHAM AND
FARCE" RULE IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
In the years since the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright' ex-
cised from the law the notion that the assistance of counsel is not
an essential element of a fair trial, construction of the constitu-
tional guarantee of counsel2 has undergone a steady, progressive
expansion. The scope of the guarantee of counsel is now very
broad under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The right to
counsel extends to any proceeding in which an accused may be
subjected to a penalty of incarceration,3 on appeal from a convic-
tion in such a proceeding, 4 and at every other critical stage in a
criminal prosecution where substantive rights of a defendant may
be affected. 5
As an aspect of this progressive expansion, Gideon stimu-
lated an increased recognition of the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel.6 The Supreme Court has indicated in a con-
sistent series of cases7 that the right to counsel means the right
to effective assistance, and that "[t]he effective assistance of
counsel . . . is a constitutional requirement of due process which
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
3. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S 353 (1963).
5. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
6. See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Postconviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Waltz].
7. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948); Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308
U.S. 444 (1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932); cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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no member of the Union may disregard."8  Although it is said
that the Court has not yet fully defined "effective assistance,"9
in two recent cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel it has said that defendants who enter pleas of guilty are
entitled to advice which falls "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."' 0 This requirement of
the "effective assistance of competent counsel"" under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments represents the Supreme Court's con-
temporary construction of the guarantee of counsel. 2
Ever since Gideon v. Wainwright-and now Argersinger v.
Hamlin"-increased the number of cases in which the assistance
of counsel is constitutionally required, the body of cases dealing
with the adequacy of the representation of defendants in criminal
cases has expanded. A denial of the effective assistance of coun-
8. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955).
9. See State v. Snead, 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974); Grano, The
Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV.
1175, 1241 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Grano].
10. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1972), quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
11. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). The Supreme Court
announced this standard in the context of a retroactive claim of ineffective assist-
ance at the time of entering a guilty plea, where the defendant alleged that his
plea was induced by a coerced confession. The Court distinguished the case
where the defendant does not have the advice of counsel (id. at 767), and deter-
mined that the defendant's
later petition for collateral relief asserting that a coerced confession in-
duced his plea is at most a claim that the admissibility of his confession
was mistakenly assessed and that since he was erroneously advised ...
his plea was an unintelligent and voidable act.
Id. at 769. Hence the issue turned upon whether counsel's advice "was within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," since defend-
ants are "entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.... .Id. at
770-71.
In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1972), a case involving a retroactive
claim of ineffective assistance at the time of a guilty plea, where counsel failed
to object to the racial composition of a 1948 Tennessee grand jury, the Court
stated that McMann
laid down the general rule by which federal collateral attacks on convic-
tions based on guilty pleas rendered with the advice of counsel [are]
to be governed ...
Id. at 264. The Court framed the issue as "whether the guilty plea had been made
intelligently and voluntarily with the advice of competent counsel...." Id. at
265. The Court remanded to a lower federal court for a finding of fact on the
issue of whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence for criminal
attorneys (holding that racial bias of the grand jury did not "automatically" entail
federal collateral relief). Id. at 268-69. It is therefore clear that in the context
of a guilty plea counsel's assistance is governed by a standard of reasonable com-
petence.
12. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 693 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). This decision extended the right to counsel to mis-
demeanants subject to a penalty of incarceration. See Portman, Gideon's Trumpet
Blows for Misdemeanants-Argersinger v. Hamlin, The Decision and its Impact,
14 SAA CLARA LAW. 1 (1973).
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sel has long been recognized as a ground for postconviction re-
lief,14 and reviewing courts are increasingly faced with allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel.' 5
Until very recently, however, the standard under which
claims of ineffective assistance were evaluated on appeal in a ma-jority of jurisdictions was exceptionally harsh, the product of an
anachronistic rule intended to discourage allegations of inade-
quate representation.' 6 In keeping with the progressive develop-
ment of the law respecting the guarantee of counsel, this older
standard is rapidly being abandoned, and newer standards ap-
plicable under the sixth amendment have now emerged.' 7
In this comment, the origin of the older rule as a standard
applicable under the fifth amendment, and its subsequent adop-
tion and inconsistent application under the sixth amendment, will
be critically examined. Thereafter, an exposition of the contem-
porary requirements of the sixth amendment and the factors
which led to the abandonment of the older rule will be provided.
The second portion of the comment is devoted to a description
of the rules applied where the older standard has been aban-
doned, and indicates that there has been a partial divergence in
the approach taken. Lastly, because the older standard persists
in California, a criticism of the rules applied in California in inef-
fective assistance cases is included.
THE "FARCE AND MOCKERY" RULE: DIGGS V. WELCH
AND ITS PROGENY
It is a curious anomaly in the history of constitutional law
that sixth amendment claims of the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel have been governed for some thirty years by a rule propounded
in an obscure District of Columbia case, Diggs v. Welch.' 8 It was
the Diggs court which first'9 articulated the current majority20 rule
that to merit relief a defendant alleging a denial of the effective
14. See Waltz, supra note 6.
15. See Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Hindsight View of Trial At-
torney Effectiveness, 27 LA. L. REv. 784, 784-85 (1967).
16. See text accompanying notes 27-56 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 76-105 infra.
18. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
19. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 1974); Risher
v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424 (Alas. 1974). A partial exception to the derivation
of the rule from Diggs v. Welch is evident in the Tenth Circuit. The rule in
that circuit derives from Thomas v. District Court, 90 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1939)
and Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1945). See Nutt v. United
States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1964). But see Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d
102 (10th Cir. 1962), following Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
20. See cases collected at Grano, supra note 9, at 1241, n.325; Comment, In-
competency and Inadequacy of Counsel as a Basis for Relief in Federal Habeas
Corpus Proceedings, 20 Sw. L.J. 136, at 138, n.15 (1966).
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assistance of counsel on appeal must demonstrate that his coun-
sel's performance was so poor as to reduce his trial to a farce and
a mockery of justice. The rule has been stated in various ways,2'
and now often includes a "sham" element, 22 but the rule of Diggs,
that "[i]t must be shown that the proceedings were a farce and
a mockery of justice"23 constitutes the prevailing standard. It is
well entrenched in the decisional authority of the several state and
federal courts, and has recently been reapplied.24
The farce and mockery rule has been extensively criticised
as a rule of decision for more than a decade, 25 and the rule is
no longer applied in a growing number of jurisdictions. 26  In
order to appreciate the force of the reasoning which has resulted
in the abandonment of the rule, it is necessary to examine certain
elements of its historical development.
The Diggs Rationale
While the farce and mockery rule is applied under the sixth
amendment to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, it orig-
21. Several colorful expressions are collected in Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA.
L. REV. 927, 928 n.4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bines]. Beckett v. Hudspeth,
131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942) required "bad faith, sham, mere pretense."
22. See, e.g., People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1963) ("sham and farce").
23. 148 F.2d at 668-69.
24. United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1974); State v. Tellez, 111 Ariz. 34, 523
P.2d 62 (1974); Abbott v. State, 508 S.W.2d 733 (Ark. 1974); Beck v. State, 308
N.E.2d 697 (Ind. 1974); State v. Snead, 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974);
cf. Peterson v. State, 215 Kan. 253., 524 P.2d 740 (1974).
25. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV.
1 (1973); Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present and Future, 49 VA.
L. REV. 1150 (1963); Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the
Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Craig]; Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORN. L. REv. 1077
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Finer]; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for
the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1434 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Effective Assistance]; and authorities cited in Bines, supra note 21, at 930 n.14.
26. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); Herring v. Es-
telle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); Kott v.
Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421 (Alas.
1974); State v. Kahalewai, 54 Hawaii 28, 501 P.2d 977 (1972); Ogden v. State,
215 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 1974); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878
(Mass. 1974); State v. Leadinghorse, 222 N.W.2d 573 (Neb. 1974); Rook v.
Cupp, 526 P.2d 605 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974); Ex parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974); State
v. Harper, 54 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973). See McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); People v. White, 514 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1973);
Hughes v. State, 507 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1974) (Sieler, J., concurring); State v.
Woolbrite, 449 S.W 2d 602 (Mo. 1970) (Sieler, C.J., concurring); State v. Turley,
318 A.2d 455 (R.I. 1974).
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inated as a standard under the fifth amendment. At the time
Diggs v. Welch was handed down, the first allegations of a denial
of "effective" assistance of counsel, based on such cases as Powell
v. Alabama2 7 and Glasser v. United States,28 had appeared in the
lower federal courts.2 9 The court in Diggs took the view that
what was required under the sixth amendment was the effective
appointment of counsel.3 0 Hence, although the petitioner in that
case alleged that his defense was incompetently conducted, the
Diggs court ruled that because counsel had been appointed and
had appeared at trial, no relief was possible under the sixth
amendment. 3" On the basis of this construction of the sixth
amendment, the result in Diggs v. Welch was a holding that relief
could be granted only in habeas corpus under the fifth amend-
ment. The court held that if the ground for appeal was the inade-
quacy of the defense, relief was possible only where the defects
of counsel's services reduced the trial to "a farce and a mockery
of justice." 2  That is, the Diggs case stands for the rule that pro-
vided an effective appointment of counsel is made, post-conviction
relief can be granted for incompetent representation only if it can
be shown that the defendant has been denied a fair trial under
the fifth amendment.
This construction of the law was current in the District of
Columbia for many years before the decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright."8 Diggs' farce and mockery language, however, was un-
critically applied in cases involving inadequate representation in
other federal jurisdictions without regard for its original applica-
tion under the fifth amendment. 34  As certain early cases were
in turn followed by state courts 5 and federal circuit courts38
27. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (designation of counsel "so close upon trial as
to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid. ... ).
28. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1941) (conflict of interest "denied Glasser his right to
have the effective assistance of counsel .... ").
29. See Waltz, supra note 6 at 290-92. For an early review of the federal
case law, see Comment, Incompetency of Counsel as a Ground for Attacking
Criminal Convictions in California and Federal Courts, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 400
(1957).
30. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 669-70.
33. See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 850 (1958).
34. E.g., Latimer v. Cranor, 214 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); United
States ex rel. Feely v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
3.5. E.g., People v. Washington, 41 Il. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968); People
v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958). For a discussion of the states'
early treatment of effective assistance cases, see Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 49 VA. L. REV. 1531 (1964).
36. E.g., United States v. Reinke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964); Lyons v.
1975] 359
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adopting the farce and mockery rule, the basic premise of Diggs,
that the sixth amendment demanded no more than an appoint-
ment of counsel, became obscured. Instead, the rule that relief
would be granted for ineffective assistance only if a mock trial
were shown was applied as-the law under the sixth amendment.,
Utility of the Farce and Mockery Rule: Prophylaxis
Even in the District of Columbia the farce and mockery rule
was not literally applied. The year Diggs was decided, the same
court held in Jones v. Huff that if the enumerated mistakes of
counsel there alleged38 could be proven, then relief could be
granted for ineffective assistance by the district court on remand. 39
Yet the court had relied upon the Supreme Court case of Moore
v. Dempsey ° in reaching its conclusion that a farce and mockery
of justice was required in Diggs.4 In Dempsey the Supreme
Court granted habeas corpus to certain black defendants who had
been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a small south-
ern town at a trial conducted in an atmosphere of mob violence.
Although the "kangaroo court" circumstances of the Dempsey
case may have been a mockery of justice, they are very far re-
moved from those of the Huff case where technical mistakes of
counsel in an otherwise ordinary proceeding were said to deny
"the accused the fair trial contemplated by the Fifth Amend-
ment.",42
Thus in Jones v. Huff, if not in Diggs, the "farce and mock-
ery" language was not literally applied. Once it was accepted that
ineffective assistance was a ground for relief, the language was
used in connection with the conduct of the defense by counsel
United States, 325 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 (1963);
O'Mally v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); Lunce v. Overlade, 244
F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); United States er rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953). Certain early cases are still fol-
lowed. See United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1974), follow-
ing United States ex rel. Feely v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1974), following United
States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
37. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 1974). See, e.g.,
Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882
(1967); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
38. 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945):
[T]he attorney for the defendant (1) failed to object to the admission
of a confession . .. (2) failed to call witnesses . . . and (3) failed to
take such steps as would have permitted the jury to see a sample of the
defendant's handwriting after a request for this evidence had been made
by a juror.
39. Id.
40. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
41. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945).
42. 152 F.2d at 15.
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rather than to describe the overall circumstances of the trial, such
as had been the case in Dempsey.43
That is, the phrase "farce and a mockery" was a metaphor.
Its utility was not as a rule of decision per se, but as a rule expres-
sive of a defendant's heavy burden of proving prejudice resulting
from inadequate representation, as is currently acknowledged. 44
This is the manner in which the rule was applied in Huff and
later cases applying the farce and mockery standard under the
sixth amendment. The utility of the rule in imposing upon de-
fendants a heavy burden of proof of their counsels' ineffectiveness
is the reason for its widespread adoption during the 1950's.
The courts very early expressed a great disaffection, an ab-
horrence, for sixth amendment appeals. 45  These appeals were
regarded as having a potentially disruptive effect upon the ad-
ministration of justice if a liberal rule were promulgated. 40  It was
believed that attorneys, faced with hopeless cases, would de-
liberately feign incompetence if relief were thereby accessible.47
Since most such appeals were thought to be the product of con-
victed defendants' resentment and hindsight, a heavy burden of
proof was imposed to stem an anticipated wave of frivolous pris-
oner appeals alleging incompetent representation.48  The courts
were extremely reluctant to issue a decision which might destroy
the reputation of the attorney involved by holding his representa-
tion inadequate, and they feared their consideration of allegations
of ineffectiveness would be turned into trials of defense counsel. 49
These concerns persist as considerations affecting the treatment
of sixth amendment appeals.5" It is evident that at the time the
43. The phrase "farce and mockery" does not appear in Dempsey nor in any
other Supreme Court case. See note 7 supra.
44. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974); Scott v. United
States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The 'farce and mockery' standard
• . . exists in the law only as a metaphor that the defendant has a heavy burden
to show requisite unfairness. ... ).
45. Waltz, supra note 6, at 291. See Note, Effective Assistance, supra note
25, at 1434.
46. See Comment, Effective Representation-An Evasive Substantive Notion
Masquerading as Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 819, 838 (1964). See Jones v.
Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ("A rule of procedure more flexible than
is necessary . . . would impose an unbearable burden upon the trial courts and
ultimately result in the defeat rather than the success of justice.").
47. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REV. 1531, 1541
(1964). E.g., People v. Mitchell, 411 II1. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285 (1952).
48. See Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 299, 301
(1973). E.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945).
49. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 792-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958).
50. Grano, supra note 9, at 1241-42. E.g., People v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 996, - Cal. Rptr. - (1975) (acerbic comments on frequency of
effective assistance of counsel claims).
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farce and mockery rule came into vogue it represented a means
of insuring that only the most egregious cases of incompetence
would be accepted on appeal.
An element of this harsh treatment of early ineffective as-
sistance cases was the once prevalent discrimination between
cases involving retained counsel and those involving appointed
counsel. Based upon an agency theory of accountability, attribu-
ting the consequences of incompetent representation to the de-
fendant, 5 ' it was commonly held that ineffective assistance of
counsel was not a ground for post-conviction relief if the attorney
had been retained by the defendant.5 2  This "[e]xpedience in
reaching preordained results," 53 transparently unjust to the un-
witting clients of incompetent retained counsel, served to forestall
sixth amendment appeals in many cases. Several courts per-
ceived, however, that the distinction was immaterial to the issue
of the adequacy of counsel's services,54 and claims of ineffective
assistance of retained attorneys were gradually subsumed under
the farce and mockery rule.5 5 But the effects of the use of de-
vices such as the agency theory are still felt,"' and the farce and
mockery rule constitutes a prophylactic limitation placed by the
courts upon the right to effective assistance.
The Farce and Mockery Rule in Practice:
Confusion and Discord
Constantly confronted with allegations of ineffective assist-
ance, the courts have reluctantly-and inconsistently-granted re-
lief under the farce and mockery test in a number of cases. More
than one case-by-case analysis has demonstrated that errors of
counsel deemed dispositive in one case are not so considered in
others with similar facts.57  Attempts to categorize judicial find-
.51. See Waltz, supra note 6, at 296-301. This distinction was sometimes
based upon a state action theory that retained counsel error was not traceable to
governmental invasion of the right to counsel. See Note, Effective Assistance,
supra note 25, at 1437-38; e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d
407, 426 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953).
52. See, e.g., People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
.53. Waltz, supra note 6, at 297.
54. Id., 300. See Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962); An-
derson v. State, 302 So. 2d 537 (Ala. Cr. App.) cert. denied, 293 Ala. -, 302
So.2d 540 (1974).
55. Craig, supra note 25, at 272; see Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25
BAYLOR L. REv. 299, 301 (1973).
56. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 270 N.E.2d 54, 58 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974) ("While
the Illinois courts still recognize the distinction between privately retained and
court appointed counsel situations, there has been some relaxation in the strict
accountability rule.").
57. Grano, supra note 9, at 1241-42; Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25
BAYLOR L. REv. 299, 316, 300-08 (1973); Note, Ineffective Assistance, supra, note
25, at 1438-48.
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ings of ineffective assistance have been made with an eye toward
enumerating the mistakes and omissions which result in reversal, 58
but such attempts impart little predictability to the application of
the farce and mockery rule. For example, one duty often
deemed necessary for the effective assistance of counsel is to con-
duct appropriate research of the law in order to prepare the cli-
ent's defense.59 Often cited for this principle is a California case,
People v. Ibarra,60 where defense counsel failed to object to the
introduction of certain evidence because of his admitted ignorance
of a rule of law. This failing was held to have reduced Ibarra's
trial to a mockery of justice.6' Yet in a later Ninth Circuit case, 62
despite an attorney's failure to research the law,63 resulting in -the
deportation of the defendant, the court refused to find a mockery
of justice."4 Hence, while a defendant may carry his burden of
proof of ineffective assistance by showing a breach of a clearly
defined duty in one case, a similar showing may fail in another.
Indeed, the vagueness and difficulty of application of the rule are
its chief characteristics. 65
In addition to its use as a measure of the burden of proof
of prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance, the farce and
mockery language has sometimes been applied as a standard for
the conduct of counsel. In the case of United States v. Wight, 6
for example, the court stated, "[t]here can be no quarrel with
the proposition that the right to counsel means the right to the
conscientious services of competent counsel. 67  The court went
on to rule:
The proof of the efficiency of such assistance lies in the char-
acter of the resultant proceedings, and unless the purported
representation by counsel was such as to make the trial a
farce and mockery of justice the mere allegations of incompe-
tency or inefficiency will not ordinarily suffice .... 68
58. See, e.g., Finer, supra note 25, at 1081-97; Note, Ineffective Assistance,
supra note 25, at 1438-48.
59. See Finer, supra note 25, at 1085. Other examples of omissions by coun-
sel for which relief may be granted are: failure to advise and consult with the
client at the time of entering a plea; failure to investigate the facts; failure to
raise appropriate defenses; failure to withdraw from a conflict of interest.
60. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
61. Id. at 466, 386 P.2d at 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
62. Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968).
63. Id. at 73 (Browning, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 71. But see Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38-39 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (counsel's failure to prepare rendered
trial "fundamentally unfair").
65. Finer, supra note 25, at 1078.
66. 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1949).
67. Id. at 378.
68. Id. at 379.
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This is the traditional use of the rule as a measure of the burden
of proof of prejudice. In a later case, Grove v. Wilson,69 a Ninth
Circuit court held: "[a] conviction will not be set aside for in-
effective representation of counsel unless the service of counsel
was of such a caliber as to amount to a farce or mockery of jus-
tice."7 Here the farce and mockery rule was applied as a stand-
ard for the performance of counsel. This case may be contrasted
with an earlier decision in the same circuit, Brubaker v. Dickson,7
in which the court stated that a defendant was entitled to counsel
"reasonably likely to render" effective assistance, 72 and held that
counsel's ineffectiveness rendered the trial "fundamentally un-
fair."78
Summary
From a comparison of such cases it is clear that the only con-
sistency in the contemporary use of the farce and mockery rule
is that a defendant must bear a great burden of demonstrating
ineffectiveness. The lack of uniformity in its application and its
use as both a standard of performance for counsel and a measure
of the degree to which an appellant must suffer a denial of due
process at trial, are the consequence of its ad hoc adoption as a
standard under the sixth amendment. It has been held that the
rule has no objective intrinsic meaning7 4-that it is a subjective
and hence arbitrary standard, as is born out by the contradictory
decisions it generates. The rule places a premium upon a show-
ing that counsel's ineffectiveness destroyed the fairness of a de-
fendant's trial which, if historically applied under the fifth amend-
ment guarantee of due process, is insensibly demanded under the
sixth amendment guarantee of counsel. 5 It is this confusion of
the requirements of due process and the sixth amendment which
has led to the abandonment of the farce and mockery rule.
THE MODERN LAW UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Perhaps the best scholarly criticism7 6 of the farce and mock-
ery rule followed upon the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.77
That opinion was viewed as a culmination of a steady alteration
69. 368 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1966).
70. Id. at 416.
71. 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id. at 38-39.
74. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974).
75. Cf. Bines, supra note 21, at 929-3 1.
76. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 25; Waltz, supra note 6; Note, Effective As-
sistance, supra note 25.
77. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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of the conceptual basis of the guarantee of counsel flowing from
Powell v. Alabama,78 with its holding that no serious 79 criminal
trial could be fair without the assistance of counsel."0 The older
view that the sixth amendment raised only a procedural require-
ment of appointing an attorney was perceived to be untenable in
light of earlier cases alluding to the effective assistance of coun-
sel.8 A guarantee of effective assistance would require that level
of advocacy which was necessary in the ordinary case to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process, 82 said to depend upon the
tripartite system of impartial court, adversary prosecution, and de-
fense counsel." It followed that a standard finding a denigration
of the sixth amendment only in the extraordinary circumstance
of a mock trial was inadequate as an expression of the require-
ments of the sixth amendment. Effective counsel was essential
to every trial. This criticism went unheeded as the farce and
mockery rule continued to be applied in cases arising after
Gideon. The number of allegations of ineffective assistance in-
creased and the prophylactic utility of the rule reasserted itself.84
As the Supreme Court continued to expand the scope of the sixth
amendment, it became increasingly clear that the conservatism of
the farce and mockery rule was out of keeping with the progres-
sive development of the law.85
What was ultimately more important for the demise of the
farce and mockery rule was that Gideon shifted the basis for relief
from due process-the "special circumstances" of Betts v. Brady"0
under the fourteenth amendment-to the guarantee of counsel.8 7
As Gideon and later cases made clear,88 it is the sixth amendment
requirement of the assistance of counsel for the defense, and not
78. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
79. Gideon was purportedly limited to felony cases. See discussion in Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 27, 30-33 (1972).
80. Waltz, supra note 6, at 289-90; see Comment, Effective Representation-
An Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerading as Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 819
(1964).
81. Waltz, supra note 6, at 293-94; Comment, Effective Representation-An
Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerading as Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 819,
822-23 (1964).
82. Craig, supra note 25, at 271; Note, Effective Assistance, supra note 25,
at 1435.
83. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
84. See Grano, supra note 9, at 1243-44 (citing later cases).
85. Bines, supra note 21, at 929-30, 934-36.
86. 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
87. See Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present and Future, 49 VA.
L. REV. 1150 (1963).
88. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("We hold . . . no person
may be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at
his trial."); see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967) (guarantee of
counsel is incorporated under the fourteenth amendment).
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the idiosyncratic circumstances of a given case or defendant,
which is controlling. Fundamental fairness to the defendant is
involved, but that concept now means that, as a minimum, de-
fense counsel must be provided.89  Since the requirement of
counsel is a requirement of effective assistance,9" the focus of in-
quiry under the sixth amendment is no longer whether an accused
was offered or provided with counsel, 91 or whether counsel had
an opportunity to prepare,92 but whether counsel has provided
services falling "within the range of competence demanded of at-
torneys in criminal cases."9
3
It follows that a mock trial standard which asks no more than
whether fundamental due process has been satisfied falls far short
of an expression of the content of the sixth amendment guarantee
of counsel. If effective assistance in the defense is required at
every proceeding in which a penalty of incarceration may be im-
posed, the exceptional demands of the farce and mockery rule
are in conflict with the contemporary construction of the Constitu-
tion. A criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance
of a competent attorney, as much as he is entitled to a fair trial.
Precisely because the mock trial standard is anachronistic in plac-
ing its sole and incondite emphasis upon due process, and because
it is now clear that the sixth amendment requires the effective
assistance of competent counsel, the older rule has been aban-
doned in Alaska," West Virginia,95 Oregon,96 and in the Sixth
Circuit. 7 In a series of cases in the District of Columbia, the
rationale of Diggs v. Welch 'has been criticized, 8 dissected,9 9 and
overruled °° for the same reasons. Although not necessarily
recognizing that the farce and mockery rule has lost its constitu-
tional underpinnings, a number of courts' 01 now require that the
assistance of counsel be within the range of normal competency,
89. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
90. See cases cited at note 7 supra.
91. Cf. Johnzon v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1940).
92. Cf. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
93. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1972); McMann v Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
94. Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Alas. 1974).
95. State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 459-61 (W. Va. 1974).
96. Rook v. Cupp, 526 P.2d 605, 606-07 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974).
97. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 694-96 (6th Cir. 1974).
98. Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
99. Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
100. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
101. See cases cited notes 94-97, 100 supra; State v. Kahalewai, 54 Hawaii 28,
501 P.2d 977 (1972); Ogden v. State, 215 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 1974). See also
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878 (Mass. 1974); State v. Harper, 54
Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
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relying upon a Supreme Court case, McMann v. Richardson.102
Other courts have adopted the substantially identical standard of
reasonably effective assistance of counsel in lieu of the farce and
mockery rule.1°3  Despite occasional judicial hesitation,"°4 the
older standard is rapidly'05 being displaced as the law under the
Constitution.
A Precursor: MacKenna v. Ellis
The progressive innovation of standards of review under the
sixth amendment has sometimes developed over time as a coun-
tervailing current in the law. In 1960, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held in MacKenna v. Ellis'06 that a defendant is enti-
tled to counsel "reasonably likely to render, and rendering reason-
ably effective assistance."'1 7  Soon after, this standard was appar-
ently adopted by ,the Ninth Circuit in Brubaker v. Dickson. 08 The
impact of this rule was at first insubstantial. Brubaker was not fol-
lowed for this principle in the Ninth Circuit,109 where the farce
and mockery rule continues to be applied as the rule of decision
in sixth amendment cases. In the Fifth Circuit MacKenna re-
ceived a mixed reaction. Under the stimulus of influential cases
such as Williams v. B eto, 1 ° which subsequently reapplied the
farce and mockery rule, the reasonableness standard was some-
times announced in the same decision as the farce and mockery
rule."' The resulting confusion was felt in the Texas courts,
whose opinions reflected the vacillation of the federal court." 2
102. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). There is little reason to suppose that the right to
the "effective assistance of competent counsel" is confined to the guilty plea con-
text. See note 11 supra. The right to counsel per se is not so limited, and the
defendant's need for effective assistance is, if anything, more acute where he
places his innocence in issue at trial. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d
1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
103. Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States,
432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); People v. White, 514 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1973); Ex
parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex Cr. App. 1974).
104. E.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
105. The high court of Nebraska has abruptly abandoned the older rule. Con-
trast State v. Reyes, 219 N.W.2d 238 (Neb. 1974), with State v. Leadinghorse,
222 N.W 2d 573 (Neb. 1974). Innovating courts have also sometimes been re-
versed on appeal. See State v. White, 5 Wash. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243, rev'd.,
81 Wash. 2d 223, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972).
106. 280 F.2d 592, modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1960).
107. Id. at 599 (court's emphasis).
108. 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
109. See United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Williams, 455 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1972); Grove v. Wilson, 368 F.2d 414 (9th
Cir. 1966). But see Leano v. United States, 457 F.2d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972) (applying both standards).
110. 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
111. See, e.g., Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
112. See Ex parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Cr. App. 1974) (reviewing
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In Herring v. Estelle,113 however, the court of appeals undertook
a review of its decisions and emphatically reaffirmed the Mac-
Kenna standard. As the rule has been clarified, a defendant is
entitled to "reasonably effective assistance of counsel."" 4  The
farce and mockery rule is no longer controlling as a rule of deci-
sion in the Fifth Circuit. Because the need for a revision of the
law has become apparent, the Ninth Circuit court should under-
take a similar reevaluation of its decisions.
The Problem of Inadequate Representation
An element in the development of the modern law is recog-
nition of the persistent problem of superficial treatment of crim-
inal defendants on the part of the courts and the legal profession.
A cornerstone of the decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin was the
observation that vast numbers of criminal cases are shunted
through the courts with only cursory consideration or preparation
by defense counsel, the prosecution, and the judge." 5 It has
been suggested that the inadequate representation which gives
rise to sixth amendment appeals may be traced, in part, to the
courts' misplaced attempts to expedite justice. 16 A corollary of
this problem is that attorneys themselves often undertake criminal
defense work as appointed or private counsel without the requisite
skill or knowledge in that specialized area of the law. It is esti-
mated that most indigent defendants appearing before the courts
of the District of Columbia are inadequately represented because
defense counsel lack experience or expertise in the criminal
law. 7  Many of the mistakes of counsel which will result in a
reversal of a conviction for ineffective representation are attrib-
utable to inexperience in the conduct of criminal trials." 8
Chief Justice Burger, in a persuasive article, has suggested
that the complexity and specialized nature of criminal advocacy
may require certification of criminal practitioners to insure ade-
quate representation." 9  In this context, Chief Judge Bazelon of
cases). A similar effect is evident in California. E.g., People v. Strawder,
34 Cal. App. 3d 370, 381, 108 Cal. Rptr. 901, 908 (1973) (applying both
standards). See notes 182-85 and accompanying text infra.
113. 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. Id. at 128. See Ex parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Cr. App. 1974).
115. 407 U.S. 25, 34-37 (1972).
116. Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society,
46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 653, 667-71 (1971).
117. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 1,
2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon].
118. Note, Effective Assistance, supra note 25, at 1451.
119. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 227 (1973). See State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 460 (W. Va. 1974).
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the District of Columbia Circuit has strongly suggested that the
farce and mockery rule, by imposing upon criminal defendants
an extraordinary burden of proof of their counsel's ineffectiveness,
has served to perpetuate substandard representation of criminal
defendants. 120 ,
These considerations underscore the Supreme Court's de-
termination that the sixth amendment requires competent assist-
ance. The Court has said, in language found persuasive by the
Oregon Court of Appeal, 12 ' that
defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective
assistance of competent counsel. . . . [I]f the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose,
defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent coun-
sel, and judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in
criminal cases in their courts. 122
Embodied in this admonition is the principle that individual courts
bear the responsibility for the integrity of the criminal proceedings
before them. The farce and mockery rule is in large measure
a rule of judicial convenience. 123  Where it has been perceived
as having failed to serve the interests of justice, the rule has given
way to a more exacting standard.'24 That is the force of the
change in the law under the sixth amendment.
THE STANDARD OF REASONABLY COMPETENT ASSISTANCE
The courts which have abandoned the farce and mockery
rule have tended to adopt a reasonable man approach for evalu-
ating the performance of counsel. That is, in assessing the per-
formance of counsel, "the standard of adequacy of legal services
as in other professions is the exercise of the customary skill and
knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place."' 25
This standard indicates that a determination of whether a defend-
ant has been afforded effective assistance turns upon the quality
of counsel's performance as measured against the normative level
of performance expected of a criminal practitioner. The question
is whether counsel has performed "at least as well as a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.' 126  This rule
120. Bazelon, supra note 117, at 28.
121. Rook v. Cupp, 526 P.2d 605, 606 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974).
122. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1972) (footnote omitted).
See note 11 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 45-56 supra.
124. State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 460-61 (W. Va. 1974); State v.
Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 557, 205 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1973).
125. Moore v. United States, 389 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970).
126. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
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is similar to that standard applied in evaluating the performance
of professional groups under the law of negligence.127 It has
been consciously borrowed from that body of law. 2 ' One com-
pelling reason for adopting such a standard is that a criminal de-
fendant, at the risk of his life or liberty, should be entitled to ser-
vices of a quality at least commensurate with that required of civil
practitioners of law. Another is that the legal profession cannot
require less of itself, where a constitutional guarantee is at issue,
than it requires of other professions in their daily practice.129
Utility of the Reasonably Competent Attorney Standard
The reasonable man approach allows a greater precision in
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As noted
earlier,' the phrase "farce and mockery" has no intrinsic mean-
ing. Under the mock trial rule, "[t]he entire area of incompe-
tence of counsel has grown in a rather haphazard fashion with
inconsistent holdings, dicta contrary to decisions, and no cohesive
line of authority to govern various fact situations. ... "I' The
reasonable man approach, however, is familiar to the courts and
bar and has long been known to provide consistency to the law.'3 2
It provides a means of undertaking a more intensive analysis of
the conduct of counsel than the all or nothing approach of the
mock trial rule.
It has often been held under the mock trial standard, for
example, that mistakes of counsel which can be attributed to trial
strategy or tactics will not be reviewed.133  The result has been
that a denial of effective assistance is not found if counsel's con-
duct can be said to be a consequence of trial tactics, although the
rights or defenses of the defendant may have been affected.3 4
Under the reasonable man approach, decisions which have the
appearance of tactical choices are reviewable:
Defense strategy and tactics which lawyers of ordinary train-
ing and skill in the criminal law would not consider competent
deny a criminal defendant of the effective assistance of coun-
sel, if some other action would have better protected a de-
127. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
128. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970). See Bines,
supra note 21, at 937.
129. State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 557, 205 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1973).
130. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
131. Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 299, 316
(1973). See notes 57-73 and accompanying text supra.
132. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
133. E.g., United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1332 (2d Cir. 1974);
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 690, 452 P.2d 329, 334, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230
(1969).
134. See Finer, note 25 supra, at 1079.
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fendant and was reasonably foreseeable as such before
trial.185
As the foregoing makes clear, the chief virtue of the rea-
sonable man approach is that it provides the courts with a measur-
able guide for determining difficult questions regarding the qual-
ity of counsel's decision making. 1 0 One suggested benefit of this
approach is that the troublesome process of establishing interpre-
tive guidelines under a prospective new rule of law is avoided,
since the courts are familiar with the concept of the reasonable
man and (presumably) with the normative levels of criminal
advocacy in their jurisdictions." 7 Another is that the application
of such a rule will serve to restrain prosecution misconduct if it
is known that exploitation of obvious incompetency will be cor-
rected in subsequent proceedings. 88
Several of the courts adopting the competency standard have
also provided explicit minimum standards for the performance of
counsel. 139  These rules have tended to encompass the more fun-
damental duties owed a criminal defendant:
(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and
as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascer-
tain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel should
discuss fully potential strategies and tactical choices with his
client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights
and take all actions necessary to preserve them. Many rights
can only be protected by prompt action. . . . Counsel
should also be concerned with the accused's right to be re-
leased from custody pending trial, and be prepared, where
appropriate, to make motions for a pre-trial psychiatric ex-
amination or for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both
factual and legal, to determine what matters of defense can
be developed. . . . This means that in most cases a defense
attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own wit-
135. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 667, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
136. State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 459 (W. Va. 1974).
137. Bines, note 21 supra, at 937-38.
138. Id.
139. The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice
has recently published a volume of ethical standards for attorneys in criminal
practice. See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971). This work is an exhaustive treat-
ment of the function and ethical duties of defense counsel at the pre-trial, trial
and post-conviction stages of criminal process. Several courts have referred to
this work as providing an appropriate guide for defense attorneys in providing
services to criminal defendants. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197,
1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 553-57, 205 N.W.2d
1, 6-9 (1973).
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nesses but also those that the government intends to call,
when they are accessible. The investigation should always
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the
prosecution and law enforcement authorities. And, of course,
the duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research.
140
While these guidelines are promulgated as basic requirements for
effective representation, the greater volume of cases that have
arisen under claims of ineffective assistance have involved the
failure of counsel to perform such fundamental duties.' It is
to ensure that the representation of counsel reaches a minimum
level of competency that explicit rules have been established.'
42
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT: DIVERGENCE AMONG
THE COURTS
In addition to the foregoing rules for the evaluation of the
performance of counsel, those courts adopting the competent at-
torney standard have propounded rules for the determination of
the degree of prejudice to the defendant as a result of ineffective
assistance. Not every negligent act or omission of defense coun-
sel is tantamount to a denial of substantial justice, and the courts
have sought to provide a means of determining whether counsel's
conduct is so incompetent as to require reversal. The basic ap-
proach is a two-step analysis which asks first whether counsel's
conduct was within the range of normal competence, and there-
after asks whether there has been prejudice to the defendant.'4
If the incompetence of counsel has been pervasive and has had
an effect upon the guilt determination process at trial,144 or if
counsel neglected a basic duty owed his client, 4" then a prima
facie case for reversal and a new trial is made out.
There is, however, a divergence of opinion as to who must
carry the burden of proof on the issue of prejudice. In those
jurisdictions which have adopted specified requirements for the
performance of counsel, a finding that counsel has substantially
neglected one or more of them shifts the burden of proof to the
140. United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968); State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 553-57, 205 N.W.2d 1, 6-9 (1973).
141. See Note, Effective Assistance, note 25 supra, 1438-42.
142. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
143. See, e.g., Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 425 (Alas. 1974); State v. Kahale-
wai, 54 Hawaii 28, 32, 501 P.2d 977, 980 (1972). And see United States v.
Hines, 470 F.2d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973).
144. United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir.
1970).
145. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
[Vol. 15
COMPETENT DEFENSE COUNSEL
prosecution to show a lack of prejudice to the defendant. 146  Else-
where, the burden falls upon the defendant to show that he has
been prejudiced. 147
Divergence Among the States
There is an apparent split of authority among the states as
to the applicability of the rule of Chapman v. California 41 in right
to counsel cases. Two state courts have indicated that they will
follow Chapman and apply the rule of harmless error to claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 149  The court in Alaska, how-
ever, with reference to the rule adopted in the Third Circuit under
the reasonable competence standard, 150 has adopted a different
test:
Because effective assistance embodies the concept of materi-
ally aiding in the defense, conduct or omissions which do not
somehow contribute to a conviction by their failure to aid in
the defense cannot constitute a constitutional deprivation of
assistance of counsel . . . . There must be a showing [by
the defendant] that the lack of competency contributed to
the conviction.' 5 '
Insofar as the Alaska court has said "all that is required addition-
ally is to create a reasonable doubt that the incompetence con-
tributed to the outcome,"' 52 this harmless error rule is closely
parallel to the Chapman rule, which requires that the prosecution
establish that the error did not contribute to the outcome beyond
a reasonable doubt. 153
This divergence seems to be a mere surface conflict since
the applicable principles are the same-there must be a showing
of an effect upon the outcome (that is, prejudice) as a matter
146. Id.
147. See note 150 in!ra.
148. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
149. People v. LaBree, 34 N.Y.2d 257, 260, 313 N.E.2d 730, 732 (1974) (ap-
plying "farce and mockery" test); State v. Thomas, 203 N.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va.
1974).
150. Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424, n.18 (Alas. 1974), citing United States
ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970).
151. Id. at 425.
152. Id.
153. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967). It was held in West
Virginia:
If counsel's error, proven to have occurred, would not have changed the
outcome of the case, it will be treated as harmless error. . . . The fed-
eral standard in regard to harmless constitutional error was held in
Chapman to be that the conviction must fall unless it can be shown that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Thomas, 203 N.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974) (citations omitted). See
Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 427 (Alas. 1974) (Rabinowitz, C.J. & Erwin, J.,
concurrin).
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of reasonable doubt. The significant difference remains that it
is the prosecution which must carry the burden of demonstrating
harmless error where Chapman is applied.
Divergence Among the Federal Courts
. The reasons recently advanced in the federal courts for re-
quiring the government to demonstrate a lack of prejudice result-
ing to the defendant as a result of defense counsel's error are com-
pelling:
Two factors justify this requirement. First, in our constitu-
tionally prescribed system the burden is on the government
to prove guilt. A requirement that the defendant show preju-
dice, on the other hand, shifts the burden to him and makes
him establish the likelihood of his innocence. It is no answer
to say that the appellant has already had a trial in which the
government was put to its proof because the heart of his com-
plaint is that the absence of the effective assistance of counsel
has deprived him of a full adversary trial.
Second, proof of prejudice may well be absent from the
record precisely because counsel has been ineffective. For
example, when counsel fails to conduct an investigation, the
record may not indicate which witnesses he could have called,
or defenses he could have raised.' 5 4
Under this rationale it is clear that a conviction will not stand
where counsel's incompetency results in a failure of effective ad-
vocacy. Such a failure is presumed where there is a breach of a
fundamental duty owed the defendant. 5
Under the Third Circuit's somewhat older rule, 5 6 a different
approach is taken. If counsel's errors have had a pervasive effect
upon the conduct of the defense at trial, such that the degree of
prejudice cannot be accurately determined, a new trial will be
granted.6 7  "In other cases the failure of counsel may be with
respect to a narrow issue or area, and it may well be possible...
to determine whether or not the departure from normal compe-
tency was prejudicial .... ,,158 In such a case, the defendant
must show that he would have benefited from another course of
action.' 59
154. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
155. Id.
156. The rule in the Third Circuit was initially formulated in Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970), perhaps the first case to confirm the reason-
ably effective assistance test as a rule of decision. Compare notes 106-14 and
accompanying text supra.
157. United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir,
1970).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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It is unclear whether these approaches represent an essential
divergence among the federal courts. In any event it is the con-
sideration that incompetency of defense counsel may affect the
validity of the guilt finding process that is controlling in granting
a reversal.
Clearly contrary is the holding in the Sixth Circuit that harm-
less error tests do not apply to a denial of the effective assistance
of counsel.16° In reaching this conclusion the court of appeals
relied upon the decision in Glasser v. United States. 16' In Glas-
ser, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he right to have the assist-
ance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute ito allow courts
to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial." 162 That case involved the appointment of coun-
sel to represent multiple defendants, and the key to the decision
was the fact that counsel had been forced to modify his presenta-
tion of Glasser's defense in order to accomodate the presentation
of the defense of his fellow defendants.' 63 The context in
which Glasser was applied in the Sixth Circuit did not involve a
conflict of interest. Rather, it was applied in a case where
"[p]otentially exonerating defenses were not explored by counsel
and were not developed at trial."' 64  Apparently because the
Glasser case did involve a finding of ineffective assistance, 65 it
was taken to express the appropriate rule regarding prejudice and
reversal
This emphasis on the failure of counsel to "explore" defenses
seems at the same time to be related to an older doctrine under
the farce and mockery rule that made a reversal possible upon
a showing of a loss of a dispositive defense. 6  If that is the case,
although counsel's conduct was evaluated under the newer com-
petency standard, the rule applied may not indicate the adoption
of a per se reversal rule. On facts not constituting an already
established ground for reversal, it may be that the rule will be
modified. It is clear that the Sixth Circuit has not constructed
160. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
161. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
162. Id. at 76.
163. Id. at 75.
164. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
165. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("We hold that the court
• . .denied Glasser his right to have the effective assistance of counsel. ... ).
166. The Sixth Circuit court announced a duty to investigate on the part of
defense counsel in a paragraph preceding its holding on the harmless error issue.
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974). Compare notes 57-
65 and accompanying text supra. An inflexible rule regarding reversal may prove
disadvantageous; one author has suggested that much of the difficulty of the courts
in utilizing the farce and mockery rule is traceable to its per se reversal require-
ment. See Bines, supra note 21.
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a rule for determining prejudice under the competency standard,
however, and has not applied the harmless error rule.
Summary
The emergence of these several rules is so recent that it is
not possible to determine whether a preponderance of authority
exists on the question of allocating the burden of proof of preju-
dice to the defendant as a result of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. But an application of harmless error principles seems to be
the preferred view in ascertaining whether a defendant has been
prejudiced. This approach has much to recommend it. It is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's announced rules for decision in
cases involving the right to counsel,167 and the issue of effective
assistance seems to fall within the purview of the federal constitu-
tional errors to which the rule of Chapman v. California ap-
plies. 16 8 Moreover, it is the government that is charged with pre-
serving the integrity of the judicial process. If it is true that our
system of justice depends upon an adversary confrontation for the
ascertainment of truth, then a showing that the defense has been
incompetently presented places in issue the quality of the guilt
determination process at trial. It follows that the prosecution
should carry the burden of demonstrating that it has obtained a
valid conviction. 69
Beyond this, there is agreement that under the sixth amend-
ment a criminal defendant is entitled to reasonably effective as-
sistance of counsel, as measured against normative levels of crim-
inal advocacy. Where the defendant is prejudiced as a result of
the incompetence of his counsel, he is entitled to relief.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967) (harmless er-
ror test applicable to denial of right to counsel at critical stage of prosecution).
168. The Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, at 23 n.8 (1967), re-
ferred to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), as involving error "requir-
ing the automatic reversal of the conviction." But if the theory in ineffective as-
sistance cases is that incompetence of counsel may affect the guilt determination
process, the constitutional error is of a different degree than where counsel is de-
nied outright. An incompetent mistake or omission not affecting the guilt deter-
mination process, while a technical denial of effective assistance, is inconsequen-
tial. Where counsel is not present, the theory is that the unequal contest between
the layman and the state's trained prosecutor is fundamentally unfair, and preju-
dice is presumed. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); cf.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972), the Supreme Court relied upon its find:ng that misdemean-
ants are prejudiced by their treatment in the courts, in holding that counsel must
be provided in misdemeanor cases. Hence a harmless error approach seems to
be appropriate in ineffective assistance cases. Contra Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); but see United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir.
1974).
169. See Chapman v. California, 386 US. 18 (1967); cf. Harriigton v. Cal -
ifornia, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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PERSISTENCE OF THE "SHAM AND FARCE" RULE IN CALIFORNIA
The prevailing rule in California governing claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment is the farce
and mockery standard. A recent statement of the rule, expressed
as a requirement that counsel's inadequacy must have reduced the
trial to a "sham and farce," appears in People v. Strickland,i"
relying upon the leading case, People v. lbarra.'17
The "sham and farce" variation of the farce and mockery
rule first appears in the law of California as dicta in People v.
Wein,172 a 1958 case obtaining this language from a federal case,
Lunce v. Overlade.17  In Overlade, the court relied 174 upon
United States ex rel. Feely v. Ragen'7 5 for this expression. Inso-
far as the Ragen court obtained 76 this rule directly from Diggs
v. Welch,177 the California rule is unquestionably counted among
Diggs' progeny.
There is some indication that a distinguishable rule free of
the due process implications of the farce and mockery standard
was applied in the California courts of appeal prior to the decision
in Wein.'17  But at least since the Ibarra court applied the Wein
dictum as a rule of decision, 7 9 the sham and farce rule has been
applied in California in ineffective assistance cases.
As is characteristic of the use of the farce and mockery stand-
ard, 80 in California the "sham and farce" rule is expressive of
170. 11 Cal. 3d 946, 523 P.2d 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974).
171. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963). See People
v. Stephenson, 10 Cal. 3d 652, 517 P.2d 820, 111 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974); People
v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); People v. Reeves,
64 Cal. 2d 766, 415 P.2d 35, 51 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1966). For a general (but
dated) review of the California case law in this area, see Comment, Standards
to Guarantee Effective Assistance of Counsel, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 108 (1968).
172. 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958). See
W. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 373 (1963).
173. 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
174. Id. at 110.
175. 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
176. Id. at 981.
177. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
178. See Comment, Incompetency of Counsel as a Ground for Attacking Crim-
inal Convictions in California and Federal Courts, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 400, at
403 (1957); e.g., People v. Logan, 137 Cal. App. 2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1955)
(not discussing due process). But see People v. Avilez, 86 Cal. App. 2d 289, 194
P.2d 829 (1948).
179. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866
(1963). See People v. Hughes, 57 Cal. 2d 89, 367 P.2d 33, 17 Cal. Rptr. 617
(1961) (citing Wein).
180. Expressions of judicial disaffection for appeals alleging ineffective assist-
ance appear in California cases from time to time. E.g., People v. Reeves, 64
Cal. 2d 766, 774, 415 P.2d 35, 40, 51 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
952 (1966) ("[It] is the general rule that 'the right to counsel may not be used
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a heavy burden of showing prejudice as a result of ineffective as-
sistance.'l 8  The apparent requirement for the performance of
counsel is counsel "reasonably likely to render, and rendering rea-
sonably effective assistance," a standard drawn from the Fifth Cir-
cuit case of MacKenna v. Ellis182 and applied in In re Saunders"3
and In re Williams.18 4  However, the requirement that a trial be
reduced to a sham is controlling in the assessment of counsel's
performance. The court in Strickland held:
Defendant has the burden of establishing-as a demonstrable
reality-evidence of his attorney's lack of diligence. Such
evidence must indicate his trial was reduced to a "farce and a
sham" . . . . This court concludes defendant has not satis-
fied his burden of showing a lack of diligence (on the part of
defense counsel) sufficient to reduce the trial to a farce and
a sham.'8 5
The issue on appeal, clearly, is whether the defendant has carried
his burden of showing a sham trial. The foregoing passage illus-
trates that it is not the guarantee of counsel which predominates
under the sham and farce rule but the fair trial element of the
Diggs rationale.
The Impact of Brubaker v. Dickson
The transfer of fifth amendment principles under the sham
trial rule has been very direct in California. Reversal is granted
only in "extreme" cases involving a loss of a "crucial" defense.
This practice derives from the holding in Ibarra that the defendant
had been denied a fair trial because his counsel's neglect had re-
to subvert the orderly and efficient administration of justice.'"). Also, in a cryp-
tic statement, the Wein court appeared to adhere to the distinction between re-
tained and appointed counsel situations noted earlier in the text accompanying
notes 51-56 supra:
The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused's own choice will
not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel
displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial
to a "farce or a sham."
People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 410, 326 P.2d 457, 473, cert. denied, 358 U.S.
866 (1958). This distinction, however, has not been made in the decisions post-
dating Ibarra. See W. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 373(ee)
(1973 Supp.).
181. See notes 38-44 and accompanying text supra.
182. 280 F.2d 592, 599, modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1961) (emphasis
omitted). Compare notes 106-14 and accompanying text supra.
183. 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1041, 472 P.2d 921, 926, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638
(1970); see People v. McDowell, 6 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1968).
184. 1 Cal. 3d 168, 176, 460 P.2d 984, 989, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789 (1969).
185. 11 Cal. 3d 946, 956-57, 523 P.2d 672, 678, 114 Cal. Rptr. 632, 638
(1974) (citations omitted).
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sulted in the loss of a defense. 186 As that aspect of Ibarra has
been construed,
[ijt is not enough -that the defendant alleges omissions of coun-
sel indicating lack of preparation ,and general incompetence.
He must show that such acts or omissions resulted in with-
drawal of a crucial defense from the case. 187
Thus, the kind of extreme case which reduces a trial to a sham
or farce has crystallized into a rule that a defendant must have
been denied a dispositive defense. 88
This rule may be traced to the Ibarra court's borrowing from
the Ninth Circuit case of Brubaker v. Dickson.'89 One passage
taken from Brubaker by the Ibarra court appears in that opinion
as follows:
"Upon an examination of the whole record, we conclude that
appellant alleged a combination of circumstances, not refuted
by the record, which, if true, precluded the presentation of his
available defenses to the court and jury through no fault of
his own, and thus rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.
. . . Such a proceeding would not constitute the fair trial con-
templated by 'the due process clause . . . .[Jones v.
Huff .... ],190
The significant factor here is that the Brubaker court was dealing
with due process concepts under the fifth amendment.
Jones v. Huff,' discussed earlier, 192 is a case that applied
the Diggs rationale -that the sixth amendment requires no more
than an appointment of counsel, but in which the court remanded
the appellant's case on the basis of a denial of "the fair trial con-
templated by the due process clause of the fifth amendment."' 3
In conformity with this rationale, the court in Brubaker applied
the requirement of an extreme case involving the loss of "avail-
able defenses" in a case within the fourteenth amendment, since
186. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 465-66, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal. Rptr.
863, 867 (1963).
187. People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 673, 689, 452 P.2d 329, 334, 76 Cal. Rptr.
225, 230 (1969).
188. People v. Stephenson, 10 Cal. 3d 652, 517 P.2d 820, 111 Cal. Rptr. 556
(1974); People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97,
73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
189. 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
190. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464-65, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 863, 866 (1963), quoting Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38-39 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963), quoting Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14,
15 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
191. 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
192. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
193. 152F.2d at 15.
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[t]he test to be applied in determining the legal adequacy of
the allegations of appellant's petition is readily stated: "The
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is for a fair
trial."194
Thus the court in Brubaker applied to a case arising out of Cali-
fornia the principle that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
constitutes a ground for post-conviction relief only if there has
been a denial of a fair trial under fifth amendment standards
originated in Diggs v. Welch.'95
Summary and Criticism
It should be amply clear that the rules under which a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated in California have
derived expressly from rules initially applicable under the fifth
amendment. Because "[t]he Sixth Amendment has overlapping
but more stringent standards than the Fifth Amendment,"' 6 the
continued validity of these rules is highly questionable. The year
after Brubaker was handed down, the Supreme Court held in
Gideon'9 7 that the fourteenth amendment encompasses the sixth
amendment guarantee of counsel. As is now clear, the guarantee
of the fourteenth amendment is not limited to the "fair trial" con-
templated by the Brubaker court, but includes the guarantee of
the assistance of competent counsel. 19 Statements such as, "[i]t
is not enough that defendant alleges omissions of counsel indicat-
ing lack of preparation and general incompetence,"' 99 fly in the
face of this requirement.
It has been recognized that the requirement of an "extreme"
case involving the loss of "defenses" is inextricably tied to the
strict evidentiary rules of collateral attack upon a conviction under
the fifth amendment.20 ' They are held to be inappropriate as
applied to sixth amendment appeals. 20 ' The rationale of Diggs
and Jones v. Huff is thoroughly repudiated and with it the basis
of the sham and farce rule.
194. Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963). The court referred to cases such as Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), and Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), in reaching this
conclusion. Id. at 37-38 nn. 32-44.
195. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). See notes
27-38 and accompanying text supra.
196. Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
197. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
198. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See notes 11, 87-
106 and accompanying text supra.
199. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
200. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
201. Id.
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Since California has adopted the Fifth Circuit rule of rea-
sonably effective assistance, 202 the California courts should be
constrained by the modifying rule recently handed down in that
circuit:
The governing standard is reasonably effective assistance.
• ..The farce-mockery test is but one criterion for determin-
ing if an accused has received the constitutionally required
minimum representation (reasonably effective assistance).
One may receive ineffective assistance of counsel even though
the proceedings have not been a farce or mockery. Other
circuits may adhere to the farce-mockery test, but we do not.
Our standard is reasonably effective assistance. 20 3
Plainly, the farce-mockery standard is no longer controlling as a
rule of decision under the reasonably effective assistance standard
of the sixth amendment.
The essential wisdom of the competency standard is illus-
trated by the incongruous results the sham and farce rule gener-
ates. In People v. lbarra, it was held that because counsel was
ignorant of certain exclusionary rules of evidence under the fourth
amendment, his trial was reduced to a "sham and farce.'"204 Yet
it appears on the face of that opinion that at trial, when counsel
failed to object to the introduction of illegally seized evidence,
the court stayed its admission and inquired of counsel (one sur-
mises in disbelief) whether he intended to object.20 5 Since coun-
sel failed to object, effectively waiving his client's right to suppres-
sion of the evidence, it was admitted. Far from conducting a
mock trial, the court demonstrated a jealous regard for the rights
of the accused. The basis for the decision in lbarra was the in-
competency of counsel, not the character of the proceeding. A
simple recognition of this distinction would go far to bring the law
in California into conformity with the current requirements of the
sixth amendment.
CONCLUSION
Diggs v. Welch was an anachronism when handed down. 06
Clear and compelling precedent existed which militated against
202. In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970);
In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969); People
v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968). See notes
182-85 and accompanying text supra.
203. Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added;
citations omitted). See West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
204. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 466, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867 (1963).
205. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 463-64, 386 P.2d 487, 490, 34 Cal. Rptr.
863, 866 (1963).
206. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963), overruling Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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its conclusion that the sixth amendment did not require effective
representation.2 °7 The reasons for the widespread adoption of
the farce and mockery rule had little to do with the rights of crim-
inal defendants under the sixth amendment, but much to do with
judicial restraint and economy. 8 Whatever justification there
may have been for impressing this harsh rule, it has been swept
away by progressive developments in the law under the Constitu-
tion.209 It is clear that the guarantee of counsel assures every
defendant who may be incarcerated competent assistance in his
defense-not merely that judicially selected few whose trials are
denominated a farce and mockery.21 0 If the farce and mockery
rule continues in effect, it does so by sheer weight of precedent.
Judicial recognition that the farce and mockery rule
"[d]erives from some older doctrine on the content of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment"211 is bringing about its
demise. The courts which have abandoned this rule have sought
to construct a standard expressing the contemporary requirements
of the sixth amendment. That standard is one of reasonably com-
petent assistance of counsel, uniformly measured among these
courts as against the normative levels of criminal advocacy.
1 2
There is present a divergence of views as to the allocation of the
burden of proof under harmless error concepts where counsel's
performance is incompetent.213  One court has held that harmless
error tests do not apply to the sixth amendment guarantee of ef-
fective assistance. 214  This divergence, however, is attributable to
the several courts' innovation of prospective rules for the guidance
of lower courts under the new standard of reasonable competence.
Over time a closer harmony may be expected. What seems cer-
tain is that the farce and mockery rule cannot continue to be ap-
plied as a rule of decision under the sixth amendment guarantee
of counsel.
Judge Bazelon, in a critique of the older rule, has said,
"[t]he 'mockery' test requires such a minimal level of perform-
ance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the Sixth Amend-
207. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
208. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 76-105 and accompanying text supra.
210. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970).
211. Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See notes
94-105 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 125-38 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 148-59 and accompanying text supra.
214. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974). See notes
160-66 and accompanying text supra.
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ment."21 5  The American Bar Association has recognized that it
is only since claims of ineffective assistance have become wide-
spread that defense attorneys have been held to account for their
service in criminal matters.2 10  The evolution of a standard of rea-
sonable competence under the sixth amendment is in part the
result of a greater awareness of the problem of substandard
representation of criminal defendants.217 It would be risible to
suggest that physicians be held to a standard of a "mockery of
medicine,' 218 and it is past time for the legal profession to take
in hand its self-regulatory duty to ensure that criminal defendants
are adequately represented.219 It is the individual attorney ac-
cepting an appointment or a fee who by diligent and conscientious
service must ensure that defendants are not penalized for reason
of a failure of advocacy.
William B. Look, Jr.
215. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 1,
28 (1973).
216. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION I (Approved Draft 1971).
217. See notes 115-24 and accompanying text supra.
218. Cf. Bines, note 21 supra, at 928.
219. Cf. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training
and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 227 (1973).
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